Liberating Potential? : The Economic Effects of Finnish Crofter Liberation of 1918 by Lindfors, Teppo
Liberating Potential? The
Economic Effects of Finnish
Crofter Liberation of 1918
Teppo Lindfors
Master’s Thesis
University of Helsinki
Faculty of Social Sciences
Economics
May 2020
  
 
Tiedekunta/Osasto  Fakultet/Sektion – Faculty 
Faculty of Social Sciences  
Laitos/Institution– Department 
Department of Political and Economic Studies 
Tekijä/Författare – Author 
Teppo Olavi Lindfors 
Työn nimi / Arbetets titel – Title 
Liberating Potential? The Economic Effects of Finnish Crofter Liberation of 1918 
Oppiaine /Läroämne – Subject 
Economics 
Työn laji/Arbetets art – Level 
Master’s Thesis 
Aika/Datum – Month and year 
May 2020 
Sivumäärä/ Sidoantal – Number of pages 
59 
Tiivistelmä/Referat – Abstract 
 
As of the 1980s, global poverty has witnessed a serious reduction. In numerous occasions, the reduction in poverty has been 
connected to an agrarian reform. A land reform is a type of agrarian reform which involves redistribution of land or changes in the 
legal framework for land administration. A large body of empirical studies have found that land reforms have proven to be a 
prominent tool in alleviating poverty. 
 
In this thesis, I examine the economic outcomes of the Finnish land reform of 1918. The reform enabled tenant farmers, which 
covered around half of the rural population, to buy their farms with a fraction of the market price. As my identification strategy, I 
use instrumental variables analysis, exploiting arguably exogenous variation in the regional distribution of tenants. I employ 
municipal level data from decennial agricultural censuses from 1910 to 1941.  
 
I find that the land reform increased capital intensity by around 23% in the two subsequent decades, which correspond to over 
third of the overall increase. Using a plain stochastic output model, I evaluate that this would signify a 14% increase in output at 
the farm level. Furthermore, I compute that the reform accelerated the structural transformation of agriculture toward dairy farming 
by 10 years. These effects are robust to controlling various municipal characteristics, such as natural conditions, population 
density and wealth. To confirm that the analysis does not simply capture dissimilarities in pre-reform development, I report 
baseline differences in municipal characteristics by regressing outcomes on the proportion of tenants with a cross-section for 
1910.  
 
These findings question the traditional view that the Finnish land reform regressed progress in agriculture. They are in line with 
the evidence on economic benefits of land reforms. As a novel contribution, this thesis is able to show that the effects are 
persistent. The exact mechanism driving the results could not be distinguished. I suspect, that the causal channel operated either 
through the farmers' improved incentives or an access to collateralizable assets, both dependent on property rights. 
Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords 
land reform, crofter liberation, instrumental variables, property rights 
 
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 The Finnish Crofter System 4
3 Literature Review 10
3.1 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2 Empirical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4 Methods 19
5 Data 24
6 Results 29
6.1 Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.2 Causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7 Conclusions 50
Appendices 58
1 Introduction
During the past fourty years or so, the world has experienced a massive success in
terms of reducing absolute poverty on a global scale. In developing countries, the
proportion of people living with less than $2 per day shrank from 64.7% to 39.4%
in 1990–2010 (Alvaredo and Gasparini 2013). In China, the proportion decreased
from 88.1% to 46.7% in 1980–2001, while in India the corresponding numbers are
89.6% and 79.9% within the same time lapse (Scho¨n 2015, p. 32).
In numerous occasions, the reduction in poverty has been connected to an agrarian
reform. This is no surprise, taking account that around 75% of the world’s poor live
in rural areas (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon, and Brink 2009). As a prominent
example, the tremendous increase in China’s median income was predated by the
decollectivization of farms in the late 1970s. India carried out a series of agrarian
reforms after decolonialization in 1947, and the period from the 1960s to the 1980s
is illustratively titled as the India’s Green Revolution due to the massive increase
in yields. Empirically, economic growth in agricultural sector has been estimated
to reduce poverty more efficiently compared to other sectors (Christiaensen and
Martin 2018). Finally, an increase in agricultural productivity has in historical
perspective often preceded the process of industrialization. According to Gollin,
Parente, and Rogerson (2002), improving agricultural productivity relieves resources
(labour) for industrial activity, which is a potential precondition for kickstarting
structural change. In England, agricultural productivity increased rapidly in 1600–
1750, which drove down its employment share from 74% in 1500 to 35% in 1800
(Allen 2009, p. 17).
Clearly, succesful agricultural policy holds a great promise considering the material
wellbeing of the world’s poor. Land reform is a type of agrarian reform affecting land
ownership. In practice, it may involve land redistribution or changes in the legal
framework for land administration, exemplified by the already mentioned decollec-
tivization in China. Land reforms have been rather prevalent in developing countries
around the break of millennia, being carried out e.g. in Brazil, Guatemala, India,
Malawi, Namibia, the Philippines, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The explicit goal
of land reforms is typically poverty reduction, by providing the rural poor the most
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common asset of an agrarian economy, land. This relieves the peasants from the
burden of a ground-rent and ideally creates incentives to improve production effi-
ciency via securing private ownership (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon, and Brink
2009).
In my thesis, I will study the economic outcomes of the Finnish land reform of
1918. At the time, Finland was a comparatively poor agrarian economy with an
agricultural employment share of around 70% (Ojala and Nummela 2007). Within
agricultural employment, around 50% of people were independent landowners, while
the rest were leaseholders (vuokraviljelija¨. Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982,
p. 144). According to Haapala and Peltola (2018), the split of peasants into two
hierarchic groups – the landowners and the landless – was the most significant social
grievance of the Finnish society in the early 20th century.
However, by the late 1950s, the share of leaseholders had decreased to mere 1.5%.1
The radical change was due to the so called Crofter Liberation of 1918, a law which
allowed crofters (torppari) and cottagers (ma¨kitupalainen) to reclaim their farms
with inexpensive prices (Peltonen 1988). By 1925, around 80,000 leaseholders had
redeemed their farms, corresponding to approximately 10% of the total arable area
in Finland (Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982, p. 192). I argue, that this mas-
sive redistribution of assets serves an interesting opportunity to examine the causal
connection between property rights and investment. My research question is the
following
◦ What was the long-term effect of the Finnish land reform of 1918 on agricul-
tural investment and production structure?
As my identification strategy, I use instrumental variables analysis (IV), exploiting
arguably exogenous variation in the regional distribution of the crofter system. I
construct a Bartik instrument which measures intensity of the land reform at the
municipal level. To confirm that the analysis does not simply capture dissimilarities
in pre-reform development, I report baseline differences in municipal characteristics
by regressing outcomes on the proportion of tenants with a cross-section for 1910.
1Official Statistics III, The 1959 Census of Agriculture, p. 22.
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As my principal data source, I use municipal level data from decennial agricultural
censuses from 1910 to 1941.
I find that the land reform increased capital intensity by around 23% in the two
subsequent decades, which corresponds to over third of the overall increase. Using a
plain stochastic output model, I evaluate that this would signify a 14% increase in
output at the farm level. Furthermore, I compute that the reform accelerated the
structural transformation of agriculture toward dairy farming by 10 years. These
effects are robust to controlling various municipal characteristics, such as natural
conditions, population density and wealth.
The thesis is structured as follows. In the following section, I provide a brief history
of the Finnish crofter system and the policies that abolished sharecropping in Fin-
land after 1918. In Section 3, I review theoretical and empirical literature on land
reforms in general, and on the Finnish case in particular. Sections 4 and 5 describe
the applied methodology and data. In section 6, I report the results and discuss
their causal interpretation and meaning. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The Finnish Crofter System
The crofter system, also known as ”widescale subfarm system” emerged in Finland
during the 17th century as a solution to the growing labour demand of manors. The
crofters were small leaseholders, who paid their rent mainly in labour.2 Manors
had a privilege to set up crofts until the mid-18th century, when the entitlement
was further extended to all independent landowners. Because of the head start,
the provinces with the most manors, namely Turku and Pori and Ha¨me, remained
the principal tenant regions as long as the system prevailed (Ahvenainen, Pihkala,
and Rasila 1982, p. 145). Nonetheless, rapid population growth rate along with
constraints on land division created a strong incentive for all landowners to estab-
lish crofts, which made the extension of the entitlement inevitable. Rasila (2003)
argues that the prevalence of tenants was an outcome of two mechanisms. Firstly,
there was the regional distribution of manors. Secondly, crofts answered to the in-
creasing land demand of landowners’ offspring and the landless population. As the
Finnish population grew over 3-fold during the 19th century (Vattula 1983, p. 17),
the demand and thus the number of new crofts increased also with a notable pace.
Peltonen (1988) calculates that around 40% of all landowners had atleast one tenant
at the eve of WWI. The proportion of tenants by municipality in 1910 is displayed
in Figure 1.
While the expanding population drew up the number of crofters, it also put pres-
sure on the subpopulation’s social status by increasing the labour supply (Soininen
1974, p. 39). The social grievance grew more and more apparent in the countryside
in the late 19th century. When the stock of available arable land began to grow
thin, cottagers replaced crofters as the most quickly expanding tenant farmer type.
Cottagers were just like crofters in every other respect, but did not earn most of
their living by farming their own land. In formal terms, cottagers were leaserholdes
who owned less than 2 hectares of own land.
On top of changing interclass tensions in the late 19th century, Finnish agriculture
also became under severe external pressure around the same period. The extension
of railway network and the spread of steam vessels integrated global commodity
2Peltonen (1988).
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Figure 1: Geography of Tenancy: Tenants in 1910 as a Share of All Farms
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Sources: Agricultural census 1910. The map was kindly provided by Matti Mitrunen.
markets in an unforeseen manner, putting downward pressure on the price of grain
(O’Rourke and Williamson 1999). While most of Europe responded to the so called
grain invasion by raising grain tariffs, Finland was among the few countries that held
on to duty-free import of grain in the latter half of the 19th century (Niemela¨ 2008,
p. 119). As the trade shock was not curbed by policy, Finnish peasants adapted by
specializing in dairy farming.3 Indeed, from 1861 to 1913, the proportion of dairy
farming of gross production in agriculture increased from 45% to 69% (Figure 2).
As a blessing in disguise, the stuctural shock that the grain invasion inflicted in-
tensified the mechanization of Finnish agriculture. From a broader perspective, the
3The shift to dairy farming was almost universal reaction to the grain invasion in Northwestern
Europe (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999). Considering the Finnish response, see Peltonen (2019)
or Peltonen (1988).
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Figure 2: Dairy Farming, % of Gross Production in Agriculture
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Sources: Viita (1965).
role of machinery was rather insignificant in European agriculture before WWI (Van
Zanden 1991). From the medieval times, productivity leaps were based on new crop-
ping techniques, breeding or on the slow application of chemical fertilizers. This was
about to change in the interwar period, when immensely labour-saving machines,
chiefly reapers, treshers and rakes began to popularize. Finland was no exception in
this respect. Structural transformation toward dairy farming relied on bulk produc-
tion of feed, and the application of machinery was most beneficial in the cultivation
of fodder crops (Peltonen 1992, p. 109; Niemela¨ 2008, p. 150). Thus, Finland’s
growing interest towards dairy production was complemented by the mechanization
of cultivation. In 1910, almost two thirds of the area under cultivation was already
allocated to fodder crops (Niemela¨ 2008, p. 144).
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While specializing in dairy farming improved agriculture’s efficiency, it was not
without distributional consequences. The structural transformation of agriculture
aggravated the rental terms of tenants. Seizing the opportunity, the landowners
pursued to shift the costs of degrading competitiveness and structural changes to
the sharecroppers. In practise, this meant increasing rents, but occasionally also
evictions. As the lands of the evicted peasants were typically turned into pasture
or grasslands, link between evictions and the structural transformation was evident
(Peltonen 2004). In addition to the structural pressure within agriculture, the kick-
start of Finnish industrialization and development of lumber industry in particular
inflated the price of timber, which put crofters at a disadvantage with respect to the
forest-owning freeholders. The income from timber was often crucial in financing
agricultural investment (Alapuro 2018, p. 41).
For the aforementioned reasons, the social standing of crofters was on a downstream
at the break of the 20th century. The average income of a crofter was around
50% to 85% of a freeholder with equal amount of land. Since crofters had smaller
farms than freeholders to begin with, saving for investment was hard. According to
Niemela¨ (2008) the most common piece of agricultural machinery, the reaper, was
too expensive for small farms, yet alone for crofts. Moreover, Peltonen (2004) ar-
gues that financing investment by bank loans was downright impossible for crofters,
because they lacked collaterals. If one could afford to invest, in either land or capi-
tal, he had to still weigh up the risk of eviction. Finally, ”extra days” which could
be required from leaseholders in addition to the agreed ground rent exacerbated
the uncertainty of tenancy. Although the extra work was paid for, it hindered the
execution of the tenants’ own harvest (Peltonen 1988).
The tenants’ grievance eventually lead to reactions in several fronts. In the 1900s,
strikes and the evictions of crofters became more common.4 The insufficient com-
pensation of evicted peasants for past investment, such as the preparation of soil,
was a constant issue. Statutory improvements in the tenants’ position began to
look inescapable in the eyes’ of the elite in order to avoid a full rebellion. Conse-
quently, tenancy laws were revised in 1902 to clarify the compensation of evicted
tenants’ investment. Effectively, the revision kept status quo unchanged, since com-
4In 1902–1909, 2000-2500 crofters had to leave their crofts. See Peltonen (2004).
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pensation was determined conditional and thus was easily avoidable (Peltonen 1992,
p. 287). In the Leaseholding Act of 1909 the tenancy laws were revised again in a
way that turned out crucial for triggering the countryside’s growing antagonism.
The act ordained the compensation of tenants’ investment mandatory and extended
the minimum length of new leases up to 50 years. The extension was prescribed ef-
fective of 1916. The immediate outcome was, that keeping tenants became generally
far more binding and unprofitable. Consequently, evictions soared. In the province
of Ha¨me, almost 30% of all tenants were evicted from 1909 to 1914 (Rasila 1970,
p. 26; Peltonen 2004).
The crofter question was set aside as Finland started a bitter Civil War in early
1918, shortly after the declaration of independence in December 1917. Only two
months after the conflict the incumbent parliament enacted a land reform which
allowed all tenant farmers to buy their farms at the price level of 1914, effective
of 1919. The reform, also known as the Crofter Liberation, was passed to solve
the crofter issue once and for all. Despite the suggestive succession of events, the
leaseholding problem’s role in inflicting the war is unclear.5 Even so, the land reform
was partly motivated by the leading parties’ will to curb the tenants’ sympathy
towards social democracy (Ja¨ntti, Saari, and Vartiainen 2006). The law was widely
utilized and it virtually ended tenant farming in Finland by the late 1940s, evident
in Figure 3. In a typical titling process, the state paid the land’s redemption price
and the tenant became a debtor to the state, while the debt’s term to maturity was
38 years. Because the nominal price of land was set according to the price level
in 1914 but the debt was paid in the 1950s, the real price of land ended up often
extremely low (Vihola 2003). In 1922, the right to acquire land was further extended
to all agricultural workers through a law known as Lex Kallio, nicknamed after
the contemporary prime minister. Lex Kallio also allowed the already emancipated
farms to expand their grounds. In priciple, the land sales in 1918–1922 were enforced
by expropriation, but in practice it was seldom necessary.
5The traditional view is, that the crofter question was not a decisive factor in iniating the
civil conflict (Rasila 1969). However, this position is challenged by recent research: see Mitrunen,
Virkola, and Merila¨inen (2019).
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Figure 3: Freeholders as a Share of All Farms 1910–1941
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1910 1920 1930 1940
Year
Fr
ee
ho
ld
er
 s
ha
re
,
 
%
Notes: The dashed line remarks that the freeholder share is assumed to be constant in 1910–1918.
Sources: Agricultural censuses 1910–1941.
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3 Literature Review
This section provides a brief introduction of previous theoretical and empirical re-
search on land reforms. I start by describing the most common theoretical insights
on the mechanisms affected by the reforms. With the benefit of hindsight, I focus
on property rights in particular and present a basic model which encaptures their
interrelation with agricultural outcomes. Next, I move on to empirical research,
reviewing studies on the Finnish land reform and reforms in general while priori-
tizing comparability with the Finnish setting. Finally, I attempt to summarize the
literature to distinguish the majority view.
3.1 Theory
On theoretical light, the effect of a land reform on agricultural production is ambigu-
ous. For one, since leaseholder farms are typically ex ante smaller than freeholder
farms, a reform pushes the farm size distribution toward zero. In case agricultural
production enjoys increasing returns to scale, the reform’s effect on productivity and
investment will be negative (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon, and Brink 2009).
Especially if the production inputs are lumpy, gaining efficiency through increasing
inputs (like expensive machinery) may call for large scale. Scale advantage is easy to
imagine when one compares e.g. threshing grain by hand to threshing by a modern
combine harvester. The latter technique is immensely labour-saving, and becomes
even more beneficial the bigger the field. However, other agricultural technologies
such as fertilizers do not necessarily behold scale advantage. Moreover, empirically
the correlation between farm size and agricultural productivity is often found nega-
tive both within and across developing countries (Adamopoulos and Restuccia 2019).
That said, in developed countries the farm size has shown an unequivocal tendency
to grow over time (Eastwood, Lipton, and Newell 2010).
Ignoring economies of scale, decreasing farm size may also boost agricultural pro-
ductivity or investment by cutting monitoring and search costs (Ravallion 2016).
In smaller farms monitoring employees is easier simply because the distances are
shorter. In addition, as smaller farms often imply more family farms, monitoring
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family members could also prove more efficient. Family farming obviously decreases
the search costs of a farm, when family members make up the labour force.
Aside from theoretical implications of changes in farm size, perhaps the most impor-
tant theoretical consideration on land reforms is the revision of property rights. In a
textbook scenario, some proportion of the landless population is granted with land
either for free or for a fee, which extends private ownership for the novel landowners.
As the ex-landless now own the land they maybe used to rent or work on, their in-
centives for investment and efficient production ought to have improved (Besley and
Ghatak 2010). The intuitive appeal of the incentive mechanism comes clear if one
takes the position of a sharecropper: investing in machinery, livestock or especially
on land is futile, if the lease is abruptly terminated. Thus, the sharecropper’s in-
vestment is limited by uncertainty related to the tenancy. Similarly, an agricultural
day labourer or a sharecropper who is paying his rent as labour has an incentive to
shirk since he is not the residual claimant.
While a land reform often extends private ownership for some, it also violates the
property rights of others. If the land reform incorporates expropration of land
from the old private landowners, it may discourage them from investing in the
future (Goldstein and Udry 2008). The underlying reason is the same as with
the sharecroppers, namely contract uncertainty, but this time around the contract
considers property rights rather than tenancy.
Based on the upcoming analysis and qualitative evidence of the Finnish crofter
system, I argue that improvement in the security of the tenants’ property rights was
a key component changing due to the Finnish land reform. To structure this idea, I
present a simple model of the interconnection between property rights and farmers’
incentives. The model was originally developed by Besley and Ghatak (2010).
The Model
Consider a single producer economy, where the farmer chooses effort e ∈ [0, 1] of
which he has an endowment e¯ ≤ 1. The effort can symbolize various things, such
as inputs of labour, land or capital. Output is stochastic, and committing effort
produces output A with probability
√
e and zero with probability 1−√e. Expected
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output is then
E(y) = E(A
√
e+ 0 · [1−√e]) = A√e (1)
The farmer’s utility is simply a sum of consumption and leisure, i.e.
u = c+ l
Now, suppose that the output is expropriated with probability τ ∈ [0, 1]. Conse-
quently, the farmer’s expected consumption can be written as
E(c) = E(A
√
e(1− τ) + 0 · τ) = (1− τ)A√e
As committing effort creates disutility, the farmer’s optimization problem is
max
e
(1− τ)A√e+ e¯− e s.t. e ≤ e¯
The first-order condition for an interior solution is
(1− τ)A
2
√
e
= 1
From which we can solve the optimal choice of effort e∗
e∗ =
(
(1− τ)A
2
)2
(2)
Equation (2) captures an essential insight: the farmer’s effort is decreasing in τ ,
i.e. it is decreasing with the risk of expropriation. This incentive effect emerges
because the farmer is uncertain whether he can enjoy the fruits of his work while he
chooses how much effort to commit. As such, the model predicts that the Finnish
land reform ought to have increased effort by eliminating the risk of expropriation
from the ex-tenants. In this study, I proxy effort by agricultural investment and
production structure. The tenants’ investment could be literally expropriated if the
tenant was evicted, since investment on land went often uncompensated. Capital
investment could not be expropriated but became redundant in case of an eviction,
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and reselling the equipment was costly. Production structure reflects effort insofar
as it captures how the farm is managed.
3.2 Empirical Evidence
There is no previous econometric evidence considering the Finnish land reform of
1918 to my knowledge. Sarvima¨ki (2011) studies a Finnish land reform of 1945,
where the primary goal was to resettle evacuated population from the region con-
quered by Soviet Union over WWII. He finds that municipalities more exposed to
the reform modernized faster in terms of production structure and experienced faster
wage growth in the upcoming decades. The setting in Sarvima¨ki (2011) is, however,
not directly comparable to the 1918 reform, since it was mainly about resettlement
rather than property rights.
Evidence from Finland
The conventional wisdom among previous research on the Finnish land reform is
that it retarded economic development in agriculture by reducing specialization and
curbing economies of scale. Indeed, agricultural sector showed some conservative
progression during the interwar period. A shift toward small-scale farming com-
bined with protectionist trade policy resulted in a more autarkic production at the
farm level (Soininen 1985). The regression is apparent in Figure 2, which shows
that the gross output share of dairy farming decreased from 69% to 61% between
the wars. Self-sufficient grain growing gained ground at the expense of commercial-
ized dairy production. Autarkic food production was actually an explicit goal of
economic policy, responding to the severe shortages which tested the Finns at the
end of WWI. During the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 grain imports from Russia
dwindled to nothing. Consequently, variety became a guiding principle of agricul-
tural production in order to strenghten the security of supply. The new ideal was
pursued by subsidies and tariffs, and the land reform was seen as another oppor-
tune intervention. Accordingly, Heikkinen (2017) and Hjerppe (1988, pp. 67–71)
judge that the land reform slowed down the commercialization of agriculture and
the structural transformation of Finnish economy in general by stimulating autarkic
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small-scale farming. Further, Soininen (1985) suggests, that the spread of smallhold-
ings curtailed the acquisition of agricultural machinery. In international comparison,
agricultural productivity was weak, reaching only 50–74% of the European average
in 1931–1935 (Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982, p. 206).
On the other hand, there are reasons to think that the land reform actually had a
positive effect on agricultural production which has escaped the attention of previous
research. First, pioneer farming geared up, leading to an increase in the area under
cultivation of almost 25% (Ojala and Nummela 2007). Vihola (2003) argues that
the improved security in the status of ex-tenants encouraged to open fields. Second,
despite pioneer farming effectively meant starting the cultivation of inferior soil,
land productivity with respect to milk and grain increased in 1920–1940. Labour
productivity followed a similar pattern (Ojala and Nummela 2007). Third, while
the land reform potentially improved the incentives of ex-tenants, it also could have
encouraged agricultural investment of the former landlords. Ahvenainen, Pihkala,
and Rasila (1982, p. 209) suggest that the landlords compensated the lost ground
rents by capital investment, which would imply that the reform had even greater
significance in terms of investment behaviour. Fourth, after Lex Kallio in 1922
enabled the ex-tenants to expand the farms they had bought, the effect of land
reforms on farm size distribution remained ultimately negligible (Vihola 2003).
Land Reforms Elsewhere
As mentioned in the introduction, land reforms have become quite prevalent tool
of development policy in the developing countries in the 21st century. Luckily, they
have also been studied extensively. The historical and geographical context of the
land reforms in current day Asia or Africa is evidently a lot different compared to the
one in Finland in the interwar period. However, it is important to note that the level
of GDP per capita in Finland by the time of the land reform was only around 1800
2011 US$, which would rank it at the bottom 12th percentile of cross-country income
distribution in 2016, implying that the economic situation in Finland was roughly
comparable to the developing world today.6 In the following review, I will describe
6Calculation is based on data from the Maddison Project Database.
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the recent empirical literature on land reforms around the world and over time and
pursue to present it in order of importance, stressing institutional resemblance with
the Finnish reform. Most of the following articles have explicitly aspired to estimate
the causal effect of the reform, and I intend to explain how.
Recent studies suggest, that increasing the output shares of farmers can produce
substantial improvement in their standard of living. Keswell and Carter (2014) study
South Africa’s Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development program, in which
the state offered land purchase grants to landless farm workers and labour tenants.
Conceptually, the purchase grants are analogous to the state loans granted over the
Finnish land reform, since in Finland inflation shifted the bulk of the loan’s incidence
to the wealthy landowners. To identify the program’s causal effect on consumption
per capita, Keswell and Carter exploit random lag in the timing of the land transfer
which was due to the bureaucracy of the approval process. They find that in 3 to
4 years, the treatment group’s per-capita consumption increases by 50% in contrast
to the control group. From institutional perspective, the reform was quite radical as
the status of the treated upgrades from a landless worker to a landowner overnight,
which may explain the program effect’s staggering magnitude. Burchardi et al.
(2018) examine a similarly fundamental incentive revision in Uganda. Burchardi et
al. run a randomized controlled trial (RCT), where they propose different output-
sharing rules for female farmers in a random manner. They discover that when a
farmer agrees to keep 75% instead of 50% of her output, she increases her production
by 60%. In addition, the acquisition of agricultural tools goes up by 29%. In the
early 20th century Finland, the tenants’ average rental stress was approximately
30–40% of net production. Consequently, once the tenant became a freeholder, his
output share increased by around 40 to 70 percent, which comes qualitatively close
to the proportional increase of an Ugandan farmer in Burchardi et al.’s RCT.
There are also valuable inquiries on the more minor incentive adjustments. In a
seminal paper, Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak (2002) use differences-in-differences to
study a tenancy reform program of 1970s in West Bengal. The program introduced
several improvements in the tenants’ status, including permanent tenure contracts
and de facto higher output shares.7 Consequently, rise yields per hectare increased
7There was no statutory increase in the output shares, but they grew as tenants gained bar-
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on average by 5% in West Bengal compared to control districts in Bangladesh. As
another example, Goldstein, Houngbedji, et al. (2018) look at an RCT in Benin,
where randomly picked villages go through a demarcation process. The idea is
that demarcation enhances security of private ownership by making land rights
indisputable. In comparison, titling over the Finnish reform strengthened security
by abolishing the threat of an eviction. Indeed, Goldstein et al. establish that the
treated villages increased their agricultural investment by 23% to 43%. However,
the short term effect on output was close to zero.
In a few other papers on land reforms or related set-ups the institutional change is
hard to evaluate. For example, Besley and Burgess (2000) focus on the cumulative
number of state-level reforms in India in 1958–1992. This complicates the interpre-
tation, because the reforms are not exactly summable. Still, after instrumenting
the stock of reforms with lagged composition of the local parliament, Besley and
Burgess report that the reforms caused a reduction in the poverty headcount ratio.
Curiously, the reforms also had a negative association with agricultural yields.
Aside from studying the effect of actual reforms, Goldstein and Udry (2008) find that
farmers with a higher position in local political hierarchy are more eager to invest
and run more profitable farms in Ghana. To handle endogeneity, Goldstein and
Udry argue that they are able to measure exogenous variation in farmers’ political
position, using variables which determine the individual’s status within the village
and matrilineage, such as parental education. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) demonstrate
that a tradition of non-landlord system in colonial era lead to approximately 40%
bigger yields in post-independence India. The authors use district-level panel data
and their treatment variable is the area under landlord control within a given district.
To deal with endogeneity, Banerjee and Iyer use an intriguing historical instrument,
which indicates whether the district was conquered by the British in 1820–1856.
Arguably, the British conquest in 1820 to 1856 increased the probability of a non-
landlord system due to reasons unrelated to post-independece yields, making it a
feasible instrument.
Considering articles with a closer historical and geographical proximity to inter-
war Finland, Markevich and Zhuravskaya (2018) study the abolition of serfdom in
gaining power.
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19th century Russia. Using province-level differences-in-differences plus instrumental
variables as their identification strategy, Markevich et al. find that the emancipa-
tion increased the Russian GDP by astonishing 17.7%. Notable thing here is that
while liberating serfs is starkly different from giving land to the tenants, in both
cases the key element changing is incentives. In Russia, second serfdom reduced the
landowners’ incentives to make capital investments, both physical or human where
the latter refers to the education of serfs. As for other neighboring countries, Olsson
and Svensson (2010) show that freeholder farms produced more crops than tenants
in Southern Sweden in 1700–1850. The authors suggest that the underlying reason
were secure property rights, which promoted investment. However, since Olsson
and Svensson (2010) cannot control for fixed farm characteristics as they lack panel
data, the estimates could be biased by unobserved time-invariant farm-level factors.
Because of the heterogenous nature of land reforms, it is of foremost importance to
know which mechanism is driving the post-reform outcomes. Relying on theoretical
work and on the context-specific institutional details of each reform, the authors
of empirical papers have proposed a variety of channels. Unfortunately, often dis-
tinguishing the particular causal mechanism is unfeasible, as identificiation relies
on quasi-experimental design and the treatment is not controlled by the researcher.
For example, while Keswell and Carter (2014) and Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak
(2002) find that land reforms in South Africa and West Bengal lead to favorable
economic outcomes, they are unable to separate whether this happens due to im-
proved incentives or the redistribution of collateralizable assets. This caveat does
not concern RCTs. Curiously, two different RCTs carried out in African countries
highlight the significance of incentives. In Uganda, Burchardi et al. (2018) establish
that strenghtening the incentives of farmers by increasing their output shares boost
production and the procurement of tools. In Benin, Goldstein, Houngbedji, et al.
(2018) argue that they can identify effect of improved security on investment exclud-
ing the influence of collaterals. Goldstein, Houngbedji et al. may focus specifically
on security, since they can measure outcomes before the farmers received transfer-
able certificates on their property. At this stage, the revision in security was based
on the laying of cornerstones.
To summarize, land reforms appear to increase production and agricultural invest-
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ment according to the majority of empirical research. That said, the evidence is not
entirely uniform, and an efficiency-equity trade-off is apparent in a few occasions:
while the reform might alleviate poverty, it can simultaneously reduce yields. Some
studies seem to suggest that the peasants’ incentives are an especially important
mechanism affected by the reforms and in producing fortunate outcomes. In spite of
theoretical interest,8 the relative significance of collaterals has been rarely examined
in empirical work on land reforms. Previous research on the economic consequences
of the Finnish land reform in particular is scant. Still, qualitative evidence indicates
that the reform curbed the commercialization and specialization of agriculture by
encouraging a shift toward small-scale farming.
8See e.g. Federico (2008, p. 120) or Banerjee and Duflo (2005).
18
4 Methods
In this section, I will elaborate the selected identification strategy, namely instru-
mental variables analysis. Ultimately, my aim is to evaluate the causal effect of a
national land reform on agricultural investment and production structure. At first
glance the identification seems troublesome: there is no natural control group as the
reform is national, not local. However, I argue that the pre-treatment proportion of
tenants provides exogenous variation in the intensity of the reform at the municipal
level.9 The larger the proportion of tenants, the bigger the change in ownership, i.e.
the greater the treatment intensity. I will construct a Bartik style instrument10 of
the following form
Bartikm,t = Tm,1910
(
Ft − F1910
F1910
)
(3)
where Tm,t is the share of tenants in municipality m in 1910 and Ft−F1910F1910 is the
cumulative change in the share of freeholders at the national level. Thus, larger
values of Bartikm,t signify greater change in proprietary rights. The analysis is
based on reduced form regressions of the following form
ymt = α + βBartikmt + φm + µt + x′mtγ + mt (4)
where yit is the outcome of interest, α is a common constant, φm is a municipality
fixed effect, µt is a year fixed effect and x′mt is a vector of controls. In essence, I am
comparing the outcomes between municipalities with higher and lower pre-treatment
share of tenants, conditional on covariates. The identifying assumption is that the
pre-treatment share of tenants would have had no effect on the evolution outcomes
absent the land reform (Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin, and Swift 2018).
In an ideal experiment, I could randomly assign different municipalities to imple-
ment a land reform. Because the treated municipalities would be randomized, I could
estimate the reform’s causal effect by simply computing the difference in mean out-
comes between the treatment and the control group.11 The instrumental variables
approach I am exploiting offers a second best option of the ideal experiment. To
9Credit for the identification strategy goes to Matti Sarvima¨ki.
10See Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin, and Swift 2018.
11Given that the municipalities are similar enough to begin with.
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realize this, first observe that the share of tenants determines the reform intensity.
The only deviation from the ideal experiment is that the share is continuous, not
binary. In the 2SLS framework, the first stage equation is
Bartikmt = pi + δBartikmt + ψm + θt + x′mtκ + εmt (5)
which is redundant because the first stage fitted values simplify to
ˆBartikmt = Bartikmt
In another words, the Bartik instrument serves also as the treatment variable. As
a corollary, the reduced form equation (4) is equivalent with the second-stage equa-
tion.12
Second and more importantly, I claim that the share of tenants is conditionally
random across municipalities. This assumption works as an imperfect replica of
randomization in the ideal experiment. In the terminology of instrumental variables,
it is known as the independence assumption. In the context at hand, the share of
tenants should be unrelated to any other determinants of agricultural investment
or production structure, conditional on controls.13 By including municipality fixed
effects, I am absorbing constant differences in the outcomes between municipalities,
such as differing specialization due to fixed natural conditions. Year fixed effects
eliminate the impact of common time effects, like the general mechanization of
agriculture common to all municipalities. Thus, what is left to be controlled for are
omitted variables which are not constant for neither across municipalities nor over
time. Following the existing literature utilizing comparable identification strategies
(Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013; Markevich and Zhuravskaya 2018; Mitrunen 2019),
I add control variables of various pre-treatment characteristics interacted with a
post-reform dummy to allow their effect change over time.
In chapter 2, I spelled out that there is mainly two sources of variation in the
cross-municipal share of tenants. First is the location of manors, as the lords of
12See Wooldridge (2010, pp. 89–90).
13In addition to the independence assumption, causal interpretation of an IV estimate requires
fullfilment of the so called exclusion restriction (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). For a reduced form
estimate, conditional independence is sufficient. See Angrist and Pischke (2009, Chapter 4.4).
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the manors had the privilege to let crofts from the early 17th century to the mid-
18th century. Therefore the municipalities which had manors at the time got a
head start in the crofting system, resulting to a potentially higher tenant share
in the early nineteen-hundreds. Second is the population density in around 1750
to 1917. While land division was illegal until the latter half of the 19th century,
population pressure was managed at the municipal level by renting crofts. Increase
in the number of potential tenants, chiefly the offspring of landowners or the landless
peasants, boosted the demand for crofts and consequently the crofter system became
particularly widespread in the densely populated areas of Finland.
Manors were large estates, on average significantly wealthier than the freeholders.
Freeholders, on the other hand, were on average wealthier than the tenants. Because
of the varying composition of manors, freeholders and tenant farmers, the ability
to afford agricultural investment and economies of scale varied at the municipal
level. For example, Niemela¨ (2008) argues that in 1910, the most common piece of
agricultural machinery, the reaper, was too expensive for small farms. Furthermore,
Peltonen (1992) shows that the tenant farmers were more poorly equipped in the
more expensive machinery, such as the treshers, in the municipalities of Tammela
and Urjala in 1912. Clearly, the average wealth of farms could affect the capital-
intensity or production structure by municipality, and is directly influenced by the
proportion of tenants. To assure that wealth differences are not driving my results,
I control for the interaction between pre-reform farm size and a post-reform dummy,
farmsizem,1910 × postt.
Higher population density increases the interaction of people in a given area. The
more there is interaction, the faster the information spreads. Therefore, it is plau-
sible that population density is positively correlated with the mechanization or spe-
cialization of agriculture at the municipal level. Peltonen (1992) elaborates this
argument by stating that the scattered distribution of farms held up the diffusion of
innovations outside Southwestern Finland. I control for the likely differences in the
diffusion of knowledge by adding an interaction term between pre-reform population
density and a post-reform dummy, densitym,1910 × postt.
Indirect links between the regional distribution of manors and population density
are no less calamitous to the validity of my identification strategy. To start with,
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consider that the location of manors is probably a function of the residential prefer-
ences of the lords. The lords most likely wanted to settle in areas where upholding of
a large estate was the most profitable, which would require nutrient-rich soil. If the
soil quality in manor municipalities is superior to other municipalities, it could affect
the trend of agricultural investment in the treatment group by altering the demand
of machinery and land. Moreover, soil quality obviously determines the comparative
advantage and thus the optimal production structure of each municipality. Accord-
ing to Peltonen (1992), climate-based comparative advantage in agriculture caused
Southwestern Finland to be clearly more capital-intensive in the 1910s in compari-
son to other regions. To account for this indirect link with my instrument and the
outcomes, I control for the timevariant effect of nutrient-rich clay soil and arid sand
soil by adding interactions claym × postt and sandm × postt. Both soil variables
measure the fraction of field under the respective soil type at the municipal level.
In addition to the quality of the soil, weather is an important part of the natural
conditions that determine the comparative advantage of agriculture. On one hand,
favorable climate improves the comparative advantage of agriculture in a given re-
gion with respect to industry or services, which probably increases the amount of re-
sources devoted to the production. On the other hand, as Federico (2008) points out,
unfavorable weather conditions increase the demand of compensatory agricultural
machinery. In sum, while weather probably influences agriculture’s regional special-
ization, it could affect investment either way, and is probably another argument of
the lords’ residential preferences. Acknowledging this, I control for region-specific
temperature and rainfall, temprt and rainrt.
Lastly, if some agriculturally-relevant public policy affects the municipalities differ-
ently according to the share of tenants, the exogeneity condition will be violated. To
my knowledge, the only relevant policies at the time were heavy tariffs and export
subsidies, insofar as they were biased toward certain products. According to Ahve-
nainen, Pihkala, and Rasila (1982), a noteworthy change was an increase in the price
ratio of grain and dairy products in the 1930s. Since one of the outcome variables
of interest is the structural composition of farming, however, the price break can be
reckoned with.
To summarize, I argue that the share of tenants is independent of potential outcomes
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conditional on municipality and time fixed effects, pre-reform wealth, population
density, soil quality and region-specific temperature and rainfall. This is a strong
assumption and critical for the causal interpretation of β. In the above, I have tried
to validate its credibility. One way to bolster the plausibility of the assumption is
to check whether the municipalities with higher pre-treatment share of tenants were
on a divergent trajectory from the municipalities with lower pre-treatment share of
tenants before the reform in terms of outcomes. Following the example of Hornbeck
and Naidu (2014) and Mitrunen (2019), I intend to conduct this precaution using a
cross-section for 1910.14
14A general discussion of testing for balance with instrumental variables can be found in Angrist
and Pischke (2015, Chapter 3).
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5 Data
As my principal data source, I am using publicly available municipal level data from
decennial agricultural censuses from 1910, 1920, 1930 and 1941.15 The censuses
include information on the number of freeholders, tenants, agricultural machinery,
farmed animals, arable area and soil quality, covering for the majority of dependent
and explanatory variables. The census data was collected by National Board of
Agriculture using door-to-door interviews covering the whole population. As inter-
viewers, the board hired people with ”agricultural know-how”, who often turned out
to be other peasants.
Combining data from the censuses and several other sources, I construct an unbal-
anced panel dataset from 1910 to 1941, using a municipality as the unit of obser-
vation. Putting up the data was not straightforward, since the municipal structure
in Finland underwent a radical change over the time frame. Specifically, municipal
separations and the loss of territories to the Soviet Union in 1940 pose notable mea-
surement problems. To address the separations, I have used municipal structure in
1910 as the basis, and aggregated any separated municipalities using a novel munic-
ipal crosswalk from 1910 to 1941. In case the separated units deviated significantly
from the 1910 borders, I have excluded them from the sample altogether.16 To en-
sure that territorial changes of any sort are not mixing up the results, I control for
the area of each municipality as a sensitivity check.
Relative to the whole agricultural population, the censuses’
cross-sectional and periodical coverage is quite impressive. As a general rule, the
censuses include all peasants who owned either any land or atleast one farmed ani-
mal.17 That said, there were some alterations on the minimum farm size included to
the sample each decade. In 1910 and 1920, the census excluded farms which had less
than 0.5 hectares of land. In 1930, the minimum treshold was decreased into 0.25
hectares, and due to the state of emergency caused by war in 1941 it was increased
15The 1930 census was collected both in 1929 and 1930.
16Details of aggregated and excluded municipalities are available upon request.
17In the 1941 census, the information on landless farmers who owned atleast one animal was
collected subsequently. Unfortunately, the quality and coverage of the subsequent material was
poor. See Agricultural census 1941 I, page 1–2.
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to one hectare (Lento 2010). Because the tenant farms were on the whole smaller
than freeholder farms, the alterations could violate the sample’s representativeness
over time. I argue that it is not much of an issue, since the miniature farms covered
less than 4% of the cows and less than 1% of the area under cultivation or the value
of agricultural machinery during the sample period, and thus could unlikely make a
difference to the results.18 Alas, the data on agricultural machinery is not available
in the 1920 census, due to flaws in the data collection process.
Considering reliability of the data, two issues arise. First, because of food shortage
and rationing by the time of 1920 and 1941 censuses, several sources suspect that
the census data on area under cultivation could suffer from downward bias due to
intentional misreporting.19 I argue that the suspicion is unlikely relevant for my
analysis, since a systematic bias in the coefficients would require that the misre-
porting was somehow correlated with the tenant shares. A more credible threat
is that poorer farms were more likely to downplay the size of their fields, but this
distortion should be captured by the baseline controls for farm size. Second, the
political situation in Finland cannot be overlooked. As of the late 1930s, Finland
fought two wars against the Soviet Union as an offshoot to WWII: the Winter war in
1939–1940 and the Continuation War in 1941–1944. The conflicts affected reliability
of the 1941 census, as territorial changes, shortage of resources and the mobilization
of farmers had an effect on the data collection process (Lento 2010). Again, I argue
that the estimates are improbably biased, since this would imply that the data col-
lection errors were correlated with the instrument. A more credible scenario is, that
the conflicts produced some random error in the dependent variables, which would
increase the standard errors of the coefficients. Nonetheless, in order to eliminate
the uncertainty of the war, I repeat the analysis while restricting the sample to the
period 1910–1930.
The definition of the key dependent variables is the following. Capital intensity is
defined as the real value of the most common agricultural machinery by the time,
18With miniature farms I am referring to farms with 0.25 to 1 hectares of own land. With
respect to machinery, the calculation is based on farms which had 0.25 to 2 hectares of own land.
See Agricultural census 1930 I, page 13; Agricultural census 1930 II, page 52 and Agricultural
census 1930 III, page 43.
19See Lento (2010) or Peltonen (1987).
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namely treshers, reapers and rakes per rural employee in thousands of 1930 Finnish
marks. The employment data I got from Population by Industry and Commune
in 1880–1975. Similarly, machines per field is the real value of the enumerated
machinery per hectare of field. The unit price for each machine I computed using
industrial statistics in 1930. Land per labour ratio is the field in hectares per rural
employee. The structural composition of agriculture I have proxied with the number
of cows per hectare of field. When this ratio increases, I have interpreted it as an
increase in the relative importance of dairy farming at the expense of grain growing.
Graphical support for the proxy’s accuracy is represented in Figure 4. At least the
aggregate series of cows per field and the gross output share of dairy farming appear
to be interconnected. Correlation between the two variables is 0.58.
Next, I describe the construction of the explanatory variables. As the instrument, I
use tenants as a share of all farms in 1910. Farm size is measured as field in hectares
per farm in 1910. Population density is the number of people per square kilometer
in 1911, which I collected from the 1913 edition of Statistical Yearbook of Finland.
Soil variables are expressed as the fraction of field under the respective soil type.
Clay soil represents nutrient-rich soil while sand soil is arid. The soil variables are
measured in 1941, but following Nunn and Qian (2011), I argue that they are fixed
characteristics and thus predetermined from the treatment’s perspective. Weather
indicators were scraped from annual agricultural censuses in 1910, 1918, 1930 and
1940.20 Unfortunately, growing season means21 of temperature and rainfall were
available only for 8 to 27 municipalities. I imputed missing observations based on
geographical proximity using the existing data. Finally, the spatial data was kindly
provided by Matti Mitrunen. Descriptive statistics of my dataset are presented in
Table 1.
20The information on temperature or rainfall was not available in the 1920 or 1941 censuses.
21Growing season mean is the unweighted average of the monthly values from April to Septem-
ber.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev.
Tenant share 472 0.45 0.24
Machines per employee 1,314 0.64 0.41
Machines per field 1,386 0.26 0.16
Land per employee 1,750 2.46 1.32
Cows per field 1,855 0.69 0.82
Population density 472 16.11 12.99
Clay soil 440 0.31 0.21
Sand soil 441 0.14 0.12
Temperature 1,868 11.57 1.16
Rainfall 1,868 293.82 40.36
Farm size 1,852 8.51 4.63
Source: Agricultural censuses 1910–1941.
Note: The variables measuring machinery are expressed in
thousands of 1930 Finnish markkas.
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Figure 4: The Evolution of Gross Output Share of Dairy Farming in Agriculture
and Cows per Field in Finland 1910–1940
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Notes: Gross output of dairy farming is computed as the sum of gross production of milk, farm
butter and beef.
Sources: Viita (1965); Vattula (1983).
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6 Results
In this section, I present the results of my analysis. I start with descriptive evidence
by illustrating the evolution of outcomes on average and by the treatment status.
I proceed with the instrumental variables analysis, presenting the reduced form es-
timates which encapture the causal relation between the land reform, agricultural
investment and the production structure. The analysis is followed by robustness
checks and a chapter on causal interpretation. I conclude the section with a discus-
sion on the underlying causal mechanisms and a reflection of the results in light of
previous research.
Figure 5 graphs the evolution of the main outcomes over the sample period. In the
interwar years, agricultural investment soared: the area under cultivation and capital
intensity experienced both a significant increase. Over the 30-year interval, field
per employee increased by around 17%, while the value of machinery per employee
grew by over 60 percent in an average municipality. Although the new land under
cultivation was undoubtedly of inferior quality relative to the already cultivated
fields, the preconditions for practicing agriculture evidently increased in Finland
during the interwar period. This is a familiar story from economic and agricultural
history, discussed already in chapter 3.
While the inputs of production reached unforeseen numbers by the early 1940s,
Finnish agriculture took otherwise a regressive turn between the wars. Agricultural
machinery consisted of familiar items from early nineteen hundreds and quality
improvements were scarce. The explicit goal of agricultural policy was autarchy,
which was pursued by subsidies for grain exports and pioneer farming. The subsidy
policy intensified in the 1930s, partly explaining the simultaneous upsurge in field
per employee. Because of the policy bias toward the growing of cereals, the number
of cows per field slumped from 1910 to 1941, apparent in the top left panel of Figure
5.22 Moreover, an increase in feed per cow lead to the moderation of the growth rate
of the livestock. In the interwar years, Finnish agriculture grew by volumes and its
structure was steered towards self-sufficiency by the state.
22The policy change of 1930s is also evident in the sudden decrease of gross output share of
dairy farming, apparent in Figure 4.
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Figure 5: The Evolution of Agricultural Outcomes on Average Municipality 1910–
1941
l
l
l
l
Machines per employee Machines per field
Cows per field Field per employee
1910 1920 1930 1940 1910 1920 1930 1940
1910 1920 1930 1940 1910 1920 1930 1940
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
0.18
0.21
0.24
0.27
0.30
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.5
0.6
0.7
Year
M
ea
n
Notes: Each point corresponds to an unweighted average of the variable in question. Variables
per field are expressed per one hundred hectares.
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As a first glance to the potential effect of the land reform, Figure 6 depicts the
development of the outcome variables in the top and bottom quantiles of munici-
palities by tenant share. The top quintile consisted of municipalities with a tenant
share of atleast 64%, while in the bottom quantile the shares were less than 23%.
After accounting for missing observations, both quantiles represent roughly a hun-
dred municipalities. Figure 6 demonstrates, that the observed increase in capital
intensity was faster in municipalities with the the most tenants: over the sample
period, the top quantile passed the bottom quantile municipalities after starting as
less mechanized in 1910. With respect to machines per field the catch-up is not as
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distinct, but still visible. Furthermore, field-employee ratio experienced a temporary
reduction in the top quintile between the wars, but recovered ultimately to its 1910
level in 1941. In contrast, the ratio grew by almost 15% in the bottom quintile. The
number of cows per field shrank notably more in the municipalities with the lowest
tenant shares, especially after 1920. Recapitulating, the graphical evidence suggests
that capital intensity boomed and the structural change favored dairy farming in
municipalities with higher tenant shares post-reform. In contrast, investment in
land took place predominantly in municipalities with lower tenant shares after the
land reform. This visualization summarizes the key findings of the thesis.
6.1 Main Results
Next I continue to describe the main results. Columns 1–4 in Table 2 report es-
timates from the baseline specification (4) for each outcome. Affirming the visual
inspection, the estimates show that the land reform increased capital intensity and
pushed production structure toward dairy farming at the municipal level. These
effects are statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the reform appears
to have also decreased land investment, but the estimate is rather imprecise and
statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
To comment on relationships of the other covariates, surprisingly, farm size corre-
lated positively with structural transformation toward dairy production, and yet
negatively with land and capital investment. In another words, greater baseline
wealth appears to have decreased investment after the land reform. I suspect that
the underlying reason was inefficient management of large farms: having high over-
all returns to begin with, they were indifferent of keeping up with the technological
frontier.23 Again unexpectedly, population density had a strongly significant neg-
ative connection with machinery investment. Instead of accelerating the diffusion
of technology, initially high population density slowed down mechanization post-
reform. Since labour was an abundant factor in densely populated areas, its price
was likely low which could have discouraged capital investment.24 The prevalence
23For an extended treatment of the importance of overall return, see Banerjee and Duflo (2011).
24See e.g. Federico (2008, p. 228).
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Figure 6: The Evolution of Agricultural Outcomes by Tenant Share 1910–1941
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Sources: Agricultural censuses 1910–1941; Population by Industry and Commune in 1880–1975.
of qualitatively superior clay soil was negatively associated with cows-field ratio,
but positively associated with field-employee ratio. These correlations are probably
due to the soil’s influence on comparative advantage, considering that the nutrient-
poor sand soil had exactly the opposite effect: grain growing was popular on fertile
lands, while dairy farming was favored in arid places. The correlation between clay
soil and capital investment was more ambiguous, but it seems that an increase in
the extent of sand soil consistently increased machinery investment, suggesting that
investment was used to even out natural conditions. Similarly, temperature had a
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Table 2: Effect of the Land Reform on Agricultural Investment and Production
Structure
Dependent variable:
Cows/X Land/L Machines/L Machines/X
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bartik 0.70∗∗∗ −0.42 1.16∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.30) (0.44) (0.33)
Post× Farm size 0.39∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗ −0.03
(0.03) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07)
Post× Population density 0.002 −0.01 −0.39∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
Post× Clay soil −0.20∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.45∗ −0.08
(0.08) (0.15) (0.26) (0.21)
Post× Sand soil 0.12 −0.07 1.44∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.18) (0.35) (0.30)
Temperature −0.76∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ −1.33∗∗ −3.75∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.31) (0.59) (0.56)
Rainfall 0.14∗∗ −0.03 0.52∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.09)
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,746 1,735 1,292 1,301
Adjusted R2 0.79 0.76 0.84 0.75
Note: The unit of observation is a municipality. Bartik is a municipality-level measure
of the intensity of the land reform. All variables are expressed in logs, except for
Bartik, clay soil and sand soil, which are expressed in proportions. All regressions
are weighted by the number of farms in 1910. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses, clustered at the municipality level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
negative relation and rainfall a positive relation with machinery investment: the
worse the weather, the more there appeared to be compensatory investment.
To provide a closer look of the results, I have rerun the baseline specifications with
other related outcomes or disaggregations of the dependent variables in Table 3. Col-
umn 1 shows, that the land reform indeed squeezed the average farm size markedly,
as proposed in previous literature. Although transforming the tenants’ leases into
titles could not shrink farm sizes per se, the underlying reason was probably the
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emergence of thousands of new small farms, bought by cottagers and the landless
population. Disaggregating the land reform’s positive causal effect on capital in-
vestment, columns 2–4 reveal that the impact was not entirely uniform: the number
of rakes per employee appears to have decreased due to the reform, albeit the esti-
mate is statistically insignificant. The reform-based upsurge in capital intensity was
primarily driven by an increase in the most common type of agricultural machinery,
reapers, and secondarily by treshers. Curiously, according to column 5 the land re-
form also decreased the employment share in primary production. My interpretation
of the regression in column 5 is, that the reform did not slow down the structural
transformation of the affected municipalities, what is sometimes suggested in earlier
research.
34
Table 3: Effect of the Land Reform on Other Agricultural Outcomes
Dependent variable:
Farm size Rakes/L Reapers/L Treshers/L Primary
employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bartik −0.98∗∗∗ −0.74 1.47∗∗∗ 0.99 −0.20∗
(0.16) (0.52) (0.40) (0.67) (0.11)
Post× Farm size −0.39∗∗∗ −0.71∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗∗ −0.49∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.03) (0.10) (0.08) (0.13) (0.02)
Post× Population density 0.04 −0.03 −0.27∗∗∗ −0.62∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.02) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.01)
Post× Clay soil 0.18∗∗ 0.001 0.36 0.83∗∗ −0.08
(0.09) (0.27) (0.23) (0.40) (0.06)
Post× Sand soil −0.20 0.02 1.62∗∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗ −0.07
(0.12) (0.35) (0.33) (0.51) (0.09)
Temperature 1.66∗∗∗ −1.73∗∗ −1.38∗∗ −1.83∗∗ 0.09
(0.22) (0.69) (0.58) (0.77) (0.11)
Rainfall −0.05 0.07 0.37∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.05) (0.15) (0.12) (0.19) (0.03)
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,745 1,269 1,291 1,282 1,736
Adjusted R2 0.76 0.87 0.83 0.79 0.68
Note: The unit of observation is a municipality. Bartik is a municipality-level measure of the inten-
sity of the land reform. All variables are expressed in logs, except for Bartik, clay soil and sand
soil, which are expressed in proportions. All regressions are weighted by the number of farms in
1910. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Table 4: Difference in Agricultural Investment and Production Structure by Tenant
Share, Relative to 1910
Dependent variable:
Cows/X Land/L Machines/L Machines/X
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1920× Tenant share −0.20∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗
(0.06) (0.09)
1930× Tenant share 0.03 −0.10 0.29∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.09) (0.14) (0.11)
1940× Tenant share 0.27∗∗∗ −0.09 0.50∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.14) (0.18) (0.13)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,746 1,735 1,292 1,301
Adjusted R2 0.80 0.76 0.84 0.75
Note: The unit of observation is a municipality. Tenant share measures tenants as
a share of all farms in 1910. Controls include log farm size in 1910, log popula-
tion density in 1910, the field under sand soil and the field under clay soil, each
interacted with the post-reform dummy, as well as log temperature, log rainfall,
municipal fixed effects and time fixed effects. All regressions are weighted by the
number of farms in 1910. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
municipality level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
An interesting aspect to consider is the evolution of the land reform’s effect over
time. Table 4 displays regressions otherwise identical to Table 2, but where the
treatment variable has been exchanged to an interaction of the tenant share and the
year dummies. According to these dynamic estimates, the main causal effects grew
larger over time. The magnification of machinery investment could be explained by
lags in investment decisions: once the ex-tenants had bought their farms, they might
have decided to wait out before making another likely loan-financed investment. The
same argument applies to the shifting production structure, which was costly and
time-consuming. The coefficients of Table 4 are also illustrated in Figure 7.
Overall, the results suggest that the land reform increased capital investment and
pushed the production structure of agriculture towards dairy farming. In addition,
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Figure 7: Dynamic Effects of the Land Reform on Agricultural Outcomes 1910–
1941
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Notes: Each point corresponds to a reduced form coefficient from equation (4). The outcome is
regressed on the variable of interest, Tm,1910 × µt, along with log farm size in 1910, log population
density in 1910, the field under sand soil and the field under clay soil, each interacted with the
post-reform dummy, as well as log temperature, log rainfall, municipal fixed effects and time fixed
effects. All regressions have been weighted by the number of farms in 1910. The blue vertical
lines represent 95% coefficient intervals, calculated using robust standard errors, which have been
clustered at the municipality level. The red horizontal line demonstrates a null effect.
the reform appears to have reduced investment on land, though the estimate was
imprecise. Still, the reduction is consistent with the changing structural composi-
tion. Relying on previous research, I argue that the causal mechanism driving the
results was an improvement in the former tenants’ property rights. As elaborated in
chapter 2, before the reform the crofters had poor incentives to invest as they were
troubled by insecurity. Often they were unable to invest due to the lack of inade-
quate funds and collaterals. On the other hand, the landowners had little motivation
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to mechanize because labour was relatively cheap. The land reform abolished the
above issues. Unfortunately, on the basis of the analysis above, it is impossible to
distinguish the mechanism’s subtleties, i.e. the relative importance of incentives or
the collateralizability assets.
To provide a sense of magnitude of the results, note that in an average municipality,
the Bartik measure increased by 0.181 units from 1910 to 1941. According to the
benchmark estimate in Table 2, this corresponds to a exp(1.161× 0.181)− 1 ≈ 23%
increase in capital intensity. Assuming that the land reform’s effect on capital
intensity approximately reflects its impact on overall effort, the reform’s ceteris
paribus effect on output in terms of the model in chapter 3 would be
y1
y0
− 1 =A
√
e1
A
√
e0
− 1 = A
√
e
A
√
(1− 0.234)e
− 1
=0.766− 12 − 1
≈14.3%
In another words, according to the model, the land reform increased output at
the farm level by circa 14 percent in the interwar period. This was a substantial
improvement in the peasants’ standard of living.
Considering the structural transformation of agriculture, I evaluate its economic
significance using a counterfactual scenario. Suppose that the relationship between
cows per field and the gross output share of dairy farming is linear. Using time
series data from Figure 4, I can produce a rough guess of the relation in 1910–1940
gross output share of dairy farmingt = 23.57 + 67.11
(
Cows
X
)
t
+ εˆt
n = 31 Adj.R2 = 0.32
where εˆ is a residual. Utilizing again the benchmark estimates in Table 2, I compute
that the land reform increased the cows per field ratio by exp(0.700×0.181)−1 ≈ 13.5
percent. Thus according to the regression line above, the gross output share of dairy
farming in 1941 would be 67.11× 0.135×
(
Cows
X
)
1941
≈ 3.5 percentage points lower
in a counterfactual world where the land reform was never implemented. Since the
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gross output share of dairy farming grew in 1860–1960 by 0.35 percentage points a
year, in the counterfactual world the stuctural transformation of agriculture would
lag 3.5/0.35 ≈ 10 years behind the observed progress.25
Robustness
In this section I study the robustness of my results. I restrict the sensitivity analysis
on estimates which provided evidence against the null hypothesis in the benchmark
regressions. According to the analysis so far, the land reform appears to have in-
creased machinery investment and pushed the structural composition of agriculture
toward dairy farming, conditional on natural conditions, population density and
average wealth. One empirical concern is functional form of the relation between
wealth and investment. If the farmers were liquidity constraint so that machines or
livestock could be bought only after certain wealth treshold was surpassed, then the
average wealth captures poorly the significance of wealth in determining the out-
comes.26 To address this concern, I include an interaction which controls for the pro-
portion of farms which had less than 10 hectares of land, postt× smallfarmsm,1910.
These otherwise identical specifications to the baseline are represented in columns
1 and 2 of Table 5. The additional control has little effect on the coefficient of the
Bartik measure. Another complication related to functional form is the treatment of
zeros in the dependent variable: in handful of municipalities the number of livestock
or machinery was zero, which makes the logarithm undefined. In columns 3 and
4, I show that the causal estimates are robust to using the inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation of the dependent variables.
25Alternatively, I could omit the intercept from the auxiliary regression to force the gross output
share of dairy farming to zero when the number of cows is zero. Doing this would translate into
5.7 percentage points lower gross output share of dairy farming in a counterfactual world.
26Banerjee and Duflo (2005) provide a thorough discussion of the connection between income
distribution and investment.
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Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis
Small farms IHS Coordinates Conley SEs Area
Cows/X Machines/L Cows/X Machines/L Cows/X Machines/L Cows/X Machines/L Cows/X Machines/L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Bartik 0.73∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 2.09∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.92∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.41) (0.12) (0.15) (0.19) (0.42) (0.31) (0.49) (0.18) (0.44)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,744 1,290 1,746 1,302 1,746 1,292 1,746 1,292 1,746 1,292
Adjusted R2 0.80 0.85 0.77 0.81 0.80 0.87 - - 0.80 0.84
Note: The unit of observation is a municipality. Bartik is a municipality-level measure of the intensity of the land reform. Controls include log farm
size in 1910, log population density in 1910, the field under sand soil and the field under clay soil, each interacted with the post-reform dummy, as
well as log temperature, log rainfall, municipal fixed effects and time fixed effects. All variables are expressed in logs, except for Bartik, clay soil,
sand soil, and the fraction of small farms, which are expressed in proportions. Coordinates are expressed in degrees. Regressions in columns 1–6 and
9–10 are weighted by the number of farms in 1910, and report robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level. Regressions
in columns 7–8 report spatial HAC standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for spatial correlation within 60 kilometer radius.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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In columns 5 and 6 I control for the time-variant effect of longitude and latitude
defined by the municipalities’ centroids. Since the municipalities with higher tenant
shares were somewhat spatially concentrated on the Southern provinces of Turku
and Pori and Ha¨me, it is important to ensure that the coefficient of the Bartik
measure is not produced by regional trends. Columns 5–6 demonstrate that this is
not the case. Another issue brought about by the threat of spatial concentration
is spatial correlation of the error term (Conley 1999). To consider this, I have re-
estimated the baseline specifications using spatial HAC standard errors in columns
7 and 8. Following Mitrunen, Virkola, and Merila¨inen (2019), I allowed spatial
correlation within 60 kilometer radius. The coefficient of the Bartik measure remains
statistically significant at the 10% level.27 A graphical inspection of the geographical
nature of the effects is presented in Figure 8. Despite the regional pattern of the
crofter system, geography does not seem to drive the results.
Over the twenty years after gaining independence, Finland went through a consid-
erable number of territorial changes in terms of municipal separations and cession
of territories. The redefinition of municipal borders could affect the outcomes in a
way that does not reflect behavioural responses. In columns 9 to 10, I account for
this potential bias by controlling for the log of the area of each municipality over
time. The results remain unchanged.
Finally, columns 1–4 in Appendix Table A1 show, that the estimates are robust
to measuring the dependent variables in levels or excluding possibly influential ob-
servations based on Cook’s distance. As a cut-off point for the latter, I excluded
observations with a distance exceeding 4/n.28 In columns 5–6, I have implemented
the gross precaution of excluding the 1940 cross section entirely. While the effect
on capital intensity is still statistically significant at the 5% level, the impact on
production structure is now insignificant. In my opinion, this is reasonable as the
dynamic estimates demonstrated the sluggish nature of the structural transforma-
tion. In total, the results appear robust.
27The results were qualitatively similar when the cutoff distance was doubled.
28See Vehkalahti and Everitt (2018, Chapter 4) or Fox (2019, Chapter 4).
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6.2 Causality
One important concern that could invalidate the causal interpretation of the above
findings is the possibility of differential trends in outcomes by tenant share preceding
the land reform. In this subchapter, I check for balance in pre-treatment outcomes
(Angrist and Pischke 2015, Chapter 3; Stock and Watson 2015, Chapter 13). If the
municipalities with higher tenant shares were more capital intensive and specialized
in dairy farming already before 1919, my estimates could simply capture differences
in underlying long-term trends. I explore baseline differences in outcomes by es-
timating a cross-sectional equivalent of equation (4) with pre-treatment data for
1910:
ym = α + βTm + x′mγ + m (6)
where ym is the outcome and Tm is the tenant share in municipality m, as before.
x′m is a vector of controls, including log average farm size, log population density,
the field under sand soil, the field under clay soil, log mean temperature of the
growing season and log mean rainfall of the growing season.
Table 6 reports the baseline differences in outcomes by treatment status. Column
3 shows, that municipalities were indeed somewhat systematically different with re-
spect to the tenant shares, even after conditioning on covariates. In contrast to
the above analysis, municipalities with higher tenant shares lagged behind in cap-
ital intensity before the land reform, suggested already by Figure 6. The lag was
solely caused by the scant utilization of reapers: keeping the covariates constant,
a fictitious municipality with a tenant share of 100% had 1.18 log points (or al-
most 70 percent) less reapers per rural employee relative to a municipality with no
tenant farmers in 1910. Considering other outcomes, the differences are small and
statistically insignificant.
To sum up the examination of baseline differences, it seems that the municipalities
with higher tenant shares were significantly less mechanized before the land reform,
when taking into account the superior natural conditions and mean wealth. The
found discrepancy is in tune with the causal mechanism I am proposing. My claim is
that the degree of mechanization at the municipal level is at least partly determined
by the uncertainty of the farmers’ property rights. Since the property rights of the
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Table 6: Baseline Municipality Characteristics, by Tenant Share
Differences by Tenant Share
Mean in 1910 Bivariate Controls
Cows/X 0.81∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ 0.03
(0.03) (0.09) (0.07)
Field/L 2.38∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.11
(0.09) (0.14) (0.08)
Machines per employee 0.44∗∗∗ 0.20 −0.77∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.28) (0.19)
Machines per field 0.16∗∗∗ −0.22 −0.88∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.15) (0.16)
Rakes/L 0.03∗∗∗ 0.58∗ −0.01
(0.002) (0.35) (0.23)
Reapers/L 0.07∗∗∗ −0.59∗∗ −1.18∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.25) (0.18)
Primary employment 0.85∗∗∗ 0.01 0.04
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04)
Treshers/L 0.04∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ −0.06
(0.002) (0.37) (0.28)
Note: Column 1 reports average baseline municipality characteristics in
1910. All variables are expressed in levels. Column 2 reports the differ-
ence for each municipality characteristic in logs by tenant share in 1910.
Column 3 reports the estimated difference in logs when controlling for
log population density, the field under sand soil, the field under clay soil,
log temperature, log rainfall and log farm size. The averages and dif-
ferences have been estimated while weighting by the number of farms.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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tenants were insecure, it is logical that capital investment lagged behind ex-ante in
municipalities where the crofter system was prevalent. The difference is also sensible
in the light of historical studies on the crofter system. In municipalities with above
average tenant shares the incentives to mechanize were low in the eyes’ of scholars.29
From the baseline differences in outcome levels one can conclude that the munici-
palities with higher tenant shares had an initial disadvantage in terms of machinery
investment, implying that they invested less on average at least until 1910. Nonethe-
less, on the basis of levels it cannot be ruled out that the differences were already
fading away before the land reform. Addressing possible differences in pre-trends
would require multiple pre-reform observations, which are unfortunately unavailable
due to the lack of data. The most I can say is, that the land reform increased machin-
ery investment and changed the structural composition of agriculture conditional on
the usual suspects, such as the differences in natural conditions, population density
and wealth.
6.3 Discussion
According to the above analysis, it seems that the land reform had a positive causal
effect on capital intensity at the municipal level. Addedly, the reform appears that to
have sped up agriculture’s structural transformation towards dairy farming. Based
on a extremely simplistic model of the relationship between property rights and eco-
nomic output, the reform increased agricultural output at the farm level by around
14%. In this section, I will discuss the results in the light of previous literature on
the Finnish land reform and also land reforms in general.
Above I calculated that after its implementation in 1919, the land reform increased
capital intensity by 23% over the following two decades. My results are roughly
consistent with two recent studies based on RCTs. Firstly, the outcome comes
quite close to Burchardi et al. (2018), who find that increasing the output share
of Ugandan tenants from 50 to 75 percent increased their use of agricultural tools
by 29%. It is also in the same ballpark as Goldstein, Houngbedji, et al. (2018)’s
findings, according to which parcels in demarcated communities increased their long-
29See chapter 2.
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term investment by 24 to 43 percent in Benin. The Finnish reform has elements
comparable to both aforementioned experiments. Like in Uganda, the output share
of former tenants did increase, as the ex-tenants were no longer obliged to pay rents
after buying their farms. The proportional increase was also of similar magnitude,
since the average rental stress was around 30–40% of the tenant’s net production
before the reform (Peltonen 2004). Of course, in contrast to the Ugandan experiment
Finnish farmers had to cover the redemption price. Similar to Benin, security over
the tenants’ inputs increased, as their leases transformed into titles. In Benin, the
demarcation made the farmers’ property rights more secure by decreasing the risk
of land seizure.
Although the Finnish land reform is contextually miles away from experiments car-
ried out in Africa a century later, because of analogous effect on incentives they
seem to yield outcomes of similar magnitude. An important distinction to note is,
that in the Finnish case we can conclude that the reform’s impact on investment is
persistent even twenty years after the reform.
Before the land reform, municipalities with widely established crofter system were
in poor position to invest. Because leases were short and evictions prevalent, the
tenants were afraid to invest: the fruits of saving could go to waste. At times, they
might be simply unable to invest. The most common type of agricultural machinery,
the reaper, was unaffordable to small farms (Niemela¨ 2008, p. 150). Due to the lack
of collateralizable assets, it was ”impossible for a crofter to fund investment by a
bank loan” (Peltonen 2004).
In municipalities with high tenant shares, also the landowners had little incentive
to invest. The abundant supply of cheap and flexible labour decreased the benefits
of labour-saving machinery investment (Alapuro 2018, p. 47). Although selling the
crofts could have increased overall output by improving the efficiency of production,
the crofter system was more profitable from the landowners’ perspective and thus
persisted.
The land reform eliminated the aforementioned problems concerning incentives and
liquidity constraints. Once the ex-tenants owned their land, acquiring machinery be-
came both safer and more feasible. For one, the risk of reselling expensive machines
went down, as their usage no longer depended on uncertain tenancy agreements. For
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two, banks became suddenly willing to grant loans as the farms could be pledged
as securities. And for three, when the landowners lost access to cheap and flexible
labour, mechanizing the production became abruptly a lot more profitable.
The booming capital intensity came about simultaneously with a structural shift
toward dairy farming. The coincidence is logical, as agricultural machinery comple-
mented almost exclusively the cultivation of feed crops, such as hay and oat. While
haymaking was done by horse-drawn reapers and rakes, in grain harvest farmers uti-
lized sickles or scythes to maximize yields (Peltonen 2019). Increasing popularity of
dairy farming was a longer trajectory in Finnish agriculture, which really intensified
as of the 1880s because of the so called grain invasion. In a globalized world the
structural transformation was inescapable: the comparative advantage of Finnish
agriculture was not in field cultivation. As the Finnish agriculture took a regres-
sive turn toward autarkic grain growing between the wars, the municipalities with
higher tenant shares were more likely to continue in commercialized dairy farming.
My interpretation is, that the specialized production structure was another manifes-
tation of an incentive-driven increase in effort in the former tenant municipalities.
If not caused by incentives, the structural change may also have been mediated by
the reduction in mean farm size. In fact, small-scale farming was considered rel-
atively competitive in dairy production by Agrarian Committee, a comtemporary
expert body (Niemela¨ 2008, pp. 129–130). As strongly complementary processes,
the structural shift and mechanization naturally stimulated each other.
Based on my results, one cannot distinguish what was the exact mechanism driving
the increase in capital intensity caused by the land reform. It could be, that the
drastic change in the relative price of labour forced the old landowners to mechanize
production.30 However, this goes against qualitative evidence. According to agri-
cultural censuses, capital intensity in small farms grew faster than in large farms
post-reform, which would suggest that the smaller ex-tenant farms were driving the
growth of mechanization.31 Another potential mechanism is the exchange of col-
lateralizable assets, which enabled the peasants to fund investments by bank loans.
Based on previous literature, the possibility to get bank loans was a pivotal change,
30An explanation brought up by Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila (1982, p. 209).
31That is, the ratio of capital intensity in farms which had less than 10 hectares of land to
capital intensity in all the other farms increased.
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but so was the incentive effect of private ownership. Unfortunately, the above anal-
ysis leaves the relative importance of collateralizability and incentives unsolved.
Nevertheless, the results of this study do suggest that the Finnish land reform
caused an acceleration in the mechanization and structural transformation of Finnish
agriculture. Based on my calculation, the reform increased agricultural output by
around 14% at the farm level, in addition to the distributional effects it undoubtedly
had.32 Accordingly, the income formation of peasants was superior to any other seg-
ment of population during the interwar years (Niemela¨ 2008, p. 173; Hjerppe 1988,
p. 71). The increasing standard of living materialized in the lives of populace in
the form of lower infant mortality, or in the ability to acquire novel consumables,
such as bicycles, factory-made sports gear or movie tickets, among other things
(Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982, p. 311).
My results also consolidate the large body of evidence on the economic benefits of
land reforms. On the basis of the Finnish experience, I would conclude that the
abolishment of sharecropping appears to lead to efficiency improvements, alongside
the likely alleviation of poverty due to distributional effects. The improvements
materialize in spite of a shift toward family farming, and do not slow down the
structural transition of the economy. Most importantly, the reform’s effects seem
to persist. Even so, one has to be careful with the external validity of the results.
It cannot be ruled out that the results are contingent on other institutional factors
specific to Finnish economy at the time, such as the availability of microcredits in
terms of credit cooperatives.
Institutions have gained ground as the most plausible primus motor of long-term
economic growth.33 This paper also contributes to the growing literature on which
precise policies may define good institutions and foster prosperity.34 As the studies
of North (1991), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2005) and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) have illustrated the
significance of institutions in causing growth in general, a natural next step is to
32Illustratively, Roikonen and Heikkinen (2018) find that the income-based Gini coefficient
decreased by over 30% from 1904 to 1934.
33For an extensive discussion on institutions and other possible determinants of growth, see
Helpman (2009) or Acemoglu and Robinson (2012).
34Banerjee and Duflo (2011).
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investigate which institutions could spur economic development in particular.35
35For a recent discussion on the connection between institutions and development in Finnish
context, see Koponen and Saaritsa (2019).
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Figure 8: Geographical Distribution of Tenant Shares and Changes in Outcomes
1910–1941
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Notes: Maps on the right visualize changes in levels of the respective outcome variables from
1910 to 1941. Maps on the left show the geographical distribution of tenant shares as a reference
point.
Sources: Agricultural censuses 1910 and 1941; Population by Industry and Commune in 1880–
1975 ; Industrial statistics 1930. The map was kindly provided by Matti Mitrunen.
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7 Conclusions
In this thesis I have examined the causal effect of the Finnish land reform of 1918 on
subsequent agricultural investment and production structure. I find, that the reform
increased capital intensity by approximately 23% in 1920–1941, which corresponds
to over third of the overall increase. Using a simple stochastic output model, I
evaluate that this would signify a 14% increase in output at the farm level. Moreover,
I compute that the reform accelerated the structural transformation of agriculture
toward dairy farming by 10 years. The exact mechanism driving the results could
not be distinguished. I suspect, that the causal channel operated either through the
farmers’ improved incentives or an access to collateralizable assets, both dependent
on property rights.
My findings extend the previous research on Finnish land reform by offering first
rigorous attempt to estimate its ceteris paribus effect on economic outcomes. I
pursue to identify causality by using instrumental variables analysis while exploiting
the regional distribution of pre-treatment tenant shares as an exogenous source of
variation in reform intensity. I show that the municipalities where the crofter system
was more prevalent before the reform had lower baseline capital intensity, what
highlights the drag of tenancy. My results confirm the prior conception that the
land reform produced a shift toward family farming by reducing the mean farm size.
Yet, my findings are at odds with the view that the reform regressed progress or
curbed specialization in Finnish agriculture. On the contrary, I find that the reform
increased mechanization and stimulated the long term shift of production structure
toward dairy farming. I back the observations with qualitative evidence, according
to which tenants and the respective landlords had poor incentives or no money
to make machinery or livestock investment before 1918. Taking stock, I suggest
that the autarkic development of Finnish agriculture over the interwar period was
an outcome of other policies, including tariffs, export subsidies and subsisides for
pioneer farming.
My results are in line with evidence on land reforms from developing countries of the
day. Especially, the estimated impact on capital intensity is of similar magnitude as
Burchardi et al. (2018) report in Uganda and Goldstein, Houngbedji, et al. (2018)
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calculate in Benin. As a novel contribution to the international studies on land
reforms, I am able to examine the reform’s effect for twenty years, and establish that
the benefits are persistent. Nonetheless, one should be careful when generalizing the
results, as they may be contingent on other institutional aspects of Finnish society
at the time, such as a competent credit market.
The Finnish experience demonstrates, that property rights play a key role in the
efficiency of agricultural production. I mention two potential mechanisms which
could mediate their effect. The first is incentives: once the ex-tenants became full
residual claimants of their effort, one would expect the tenants’ inputs to increase.
The second is collaterals: according to several sources, investment was often unaf-
fordable to tenants pre-reform, but this changed when the tenants could pledge the
farms as securities for loans. The relative importance of the two mechanisms is an
important avenue for future research. The most I can say is, that property rights
matter.
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Table A1: Additional Specifications
Levels Cook’s distance Excluding 1940
Cows/X Machines/L Cows/X Machines/L Cows/X Machines/L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bartik 0.77∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 0.23 0.85∗∗
(0.20) (0.20) (0.12) (0.28) (0.15) (0.42)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,746 1,302 1,626 1,159 1,309 860
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.78 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.88
Note: The unit of observation is a municipality. Bartik is a municipality-level measure of the inten-
sity of the land reform. Controls include log farm size in 1910, log population density in 1910, the
field under sand soil and the field under clay soil, each interacted with the post-reform dummy, as
well as log temperature, log rainfall, municipal fixed effects and time fixed effects. All explanatory
variables are expressed in logs, except for Bartik, clay soil and sand soil, which are expressed in pro-
portions. Dependent variable is in levels in columns 1–2 and in logs in columns 3–6. All regressions
are weighted by the number of farms in 1910. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
the municipality level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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